Make Your Own Kind of Music: Queer Student Groups and the First Amendment by Gewirtzman, Doni
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Articles & Chapters
1998
Make Your Own Kind of Music: Queer Student
Groups and the First Amendment
Doni Gewirtzman
New York Law School, doni.gewirtzman@nyls.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
86 Cal. L. Rev. 1131 (1998)
"Make Your Own Kind of Music": 
Queer Student Groups and 
the First Amendment 
Doni Gewirtzmant 
As openly gay and lesbian students become a more regular pres-
ence in public high schools, students in many schools have started les-
bian and gay student organizations. In response, some school districts 
and state legislatures have attempted to prevent the clubs from meeting, 
either through categorical bans on all extracurricular groups or 
through legislation specifically designed to prevent the gay clubs from 
meeting. This Comment examines the First Amendment issues raised by 
these efforts. It argues that the Supreme Court's current approach to 
student speech, which focuses on whether the speech is school spon-
sored and on the application of public forum doctrine, lacks an under-
lying rationale and leads to inconsistent outcomes. In its place, the 
author urges the Court to adopt a mission-based test that examines the 
relationship between the regulation on speech and the educational pur-
pose underlying the activity. Because student clubs generally exist to 
promote self-exploration and foster the development of individual iden-
tity, this new test would extend First Amendment protection to gay and 
lesbian student groups. 
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It may be rough going 
Just to do your thing's the hardest thing to do 
But you 've got to 
Make your own kind of music 
Sing your own special song 
Make your own kind of music 




In the fall of 1995, Kelli Peterson, a senior at East High School in 
Salt Lake City, decided to form a gay/straight alliance at her school.2 
The club was certainly not the country's first3 and was one of a number 
of clubs at the school that focused on issues related to group identity. 
The Salt Lake City school district responded to the alliance with 
immediate hostility. In order to restrict the alliance's ability to meet 
while complying with the terms of the Equal Access Act,4 a federal law 
constraining the ability of school districts to deny recognition selec-
tively to school-affiliated student organizations, the school board 
banned all non-curriculum-related clubs from Salt Lake City public 
schools.5 Students, in turn, responded with walkouts and protests against 
the board's decision,6 objecting not to the attack on the queer7 student 
club but to the widespread effects of the ban on other student clubs.8 A 
small group of students responded differently, starting a club known as 
SAFE-Students Against Faggots Everywhere.9 
1. MAMA CASS, Make Your Own Kind of Music, on Music FROM THE MOTION PICTURE 
BEAUTIFUL THING (MCA Records 1996). 
2. See Mark Walsh, Gay Students' Request Spurs Board to Cut Clubs, EDUC. WK., Feb. 28, 
1996, at 6. 
3. See Kelli Kristine Armstrong, The Silent Minority Within a Minority: Focusing on the Needs 
of Gay Youth in our Public Schools, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L REV. 67, 89-90 (1994); Warren J. 
Blumenfeld, Gay/Straight Alliances: Transforming Pain into Pride, in THE GAY TEEN: EDUCATIONAL 
PRACTICE AND THEORY FOR LESBIAN, GAY AND BISEXUAL ADOLESCENTS 211, 212-13 (Gerald 
Unks ed., 1995). 
4. 20 u.s.c. §§ 4071-4074 (1994). 
5. See Walsh, supra note 2, at 6. 
6. See Samuel Autman et al., S.L. Students Rally, Rail and Rebel, SALT LAKE CITY Tarn., Feb. 
24, 1996, at Al; Robert Bryson, More than 1,000 Protest Club Ban, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB., Mar. 3, 
1996, at Cl. 
7. I use the word "queer" as an inclusive, nonderogatory term to encompass gay, lesbian, 
bisexual, and transgendered individuals. 
8. See Autman, supra note 6, at A 1. 
9. See Samuel Autman, Club Ban Sparks Fear, Loathing, SALT LAKE CITY Turn., Feb. 22, 
1996, at Al. 
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Evidently, the school board's action was not sufficient to satisfy 
Utah state legislators. Following a closed door meeting, 10 Utah legisla-
tors passed S.B. 1003.11 After finding that "certain activities, programs, 
and conduct are ... detrimental to the physical, emotional, psychologi-
cal, and moral well being of students and faculty,"12 the statute states 
that "local school boards shall deny access to any student organization 
or club whose program and activities would materially or substan-
tially: (i) encourage criminal or delinquent conduct; (ii) promote big-
otry; (iii) or involve human sexuality."13 A lawsuit against the Salt Lake 
City school board's actions is underway,14 and similar controversies have 
begun to erupt in other states.15 
If reviewing courts follow the most recent Supreme Court decision 
addressing the First Amendment rights of high school students, 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 16 they will likely apply an 
overly circumscribed analysis that turns on whether or not the speech 
of the club is "school sponsored."17 If the speech of the clubs is consid-
ered school-sponsored speech, courts will subject the state's action to 
minimal constitutional scrutiny, creating a high likelihood that the ban 
will survive a constitutional challenge. Alternatively, if the reviewing 
court finds that the speech is not school sponsored, it will apply a more 
exacting type of constitutional review that focuses on whether the 
speech of the clubs would constitute a "material or substantial disrup-
tion" to the operation of the school.18 
This Comment argues that the Court's current approach to student 
speech issues, which focuses on school sponsorship and public forum 
doctrine, is fundamentally misguided. By conditioning constitutional 
protection on facial considerations of sponsorship, the Court has 
IO. See Dan Harrie & Judy Fahys, Lawmakers Settle Secret Meeting Suit, SALT LAKE CITY 
Tum., Feb. 20, I997, at Al. 
II. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 53A-3-419 (1996). 
12. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-3-419(2)(a) (I996). 
13. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 53A-3-419(2)(a)(i)-(iii) (1996) (emphasis added). The statute grants 
local school boards the authority to determine whether a given club falls within the definition of the 
law. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-3-419 (2)(b) (1996). The Alliance continues to meet without 
formal school recognition or funding, but it meets after school, when Utah's schools become public 
forums under a state statute. See Katherine Kapos, Legacy of Utah's Gay-Club Furor; Policy Could 
Allow Gay Clubs, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB., Jan. 10, 1997, at DI. 
14. See Civil-Rights Groups Sue Over School-Clubs Ban, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB., Mar. 21, 
1998, at Al. 
15. See David Olinger, School Gay Rights Group Sues, DENVER POST, Jan. 23, 1998, at Cl; 
Renate Robey, School District to Recognize Gay, Heterosexual Club, DENVER POST, Feb. 28, 1998, at 
Bl;Arizona Legislators Pattern Gay-Club Ban on Utah Law, SALT LAKE CITY TR!B., Dec. 25, I996, 
at A23; see also Rachel D'Oro, Tempest Brews Over Gay Student Club, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, 
Nov. 22, 1996, at 18. 
I6. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
17. See id. at 270-73. 
18. See Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Community Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
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created a constitutional doctrine that lacks a compelling rationale. I 
argue that the Court's two stated explanations for focusing on school 
sponsorship--protecting the school's proprietary interests and mini-
mizing the risk that external observers will attribute student speech to 
the school-do not adequately explain the broad discretion granted to 
school authorities. In the process, the doctrine creates unjustifiable in-
consistencies between the speech rights of high school and college stu-
dents. 
This Comment suggests that, instead of focusing on sponsorship, 
the Court should adopt a constitutional test that inquires into the func-
tion of educational institutions and ascertains the nature of the relation-
ship between the regulation of speech and the mission of the 
educational institution.19 A mission-based test would allow the Court to 
make principled distinctions among different types of school activities 
and to ground student speech doctrine in social commitments to First 
Amendment values and organizational function, considerations that are 
already present at a subtextual level in prior precedent. While the pro-
liferation of queer student groups inevitably raises constitutional issues 
related to freedom of association, prior restraint,20 state action doc-
trine,21 the relationship between sexuality and the First Amendment,22 
and statutory questions under the Equal Access Act, 23 these analyses are 
beyond the scope of this Comment. 
Parts I and II give a history of the Court's major student speech 
decisions and provide a brief overview of public forum doctrine. Part III 
examines the Hazelwood decision's use of public forum doctrine and its 
19. I derive this suggested approach from the work of Professor Robert C. Post See generally 
Robert C. Post, Behveen Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Fon1m, 
34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987) [hereinafter Post, Behveen Governance and Management]; Robert C. 
Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267 (1991) 
[hereinafter Post, Racist Speech]; Robert Post, ReC11perating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 1249 (1995) [hereinafter Post, ReC11perating First Amendment Doctrine]. 
20. See Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1540-41 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
school policy requiring written permission to distribute non-school-sponsored materials was not an 
unconstitutional prior restraint on speech). 
21. See, e.g., Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131F.3d241 (Isl Cir. 1997) (holding that high school 
yearbook's decision not to run certain advertisements was not state action). 
22. See generally Daniel S. Alter, Confronting the Queer and Present Danger, 22 HUM. RTs. 22 
(1995); Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695 (1993); Brent Hunter 
Allen, Note, The First Amendment and Homosexual Expression: The Need for an Expanded 
Interpretation, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1073 (1994). 
23. In fact, it is far more likely that litigants will bring challenges to club bans under the Equal 
Access Act rather than the First Amendment See, e.g., Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 
F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding after-school club's Christian officer requirement under the Equal 
Access Act); Ceniceros v. Board of Trustees of the San Diego Unified Sch. Dist, 66 F.3d 1535 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (holding that school's refusal to allow student religious club to meet during school period 
violated the Act); Pope v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F.3d 1244 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that 
school's refusal to certify student Bible club violated the Act). 
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introduction of sponsorship into First Amendment jurisprudence. Part 
IV examines how a reviewing court might treat the Utah statute under 
current doctrine. Part V argues that there is no underlying rationale for 
using school sponsorship to determine the free speech rights of student 
clubs, while Part VI argues that the Court should adopt a mission-based 
rationale instead of focusing on sponsorship. Finally, Part VII applies 
the suggested mission-based test to student groups, arguing that gay and 
lesbian student groups are entitled to constitutional protection. 
I 
Tinker TO Fraser: 
THE EVOLUTION OF STUDENT SPEECH DOCTRINE 
Before exploring how a reviewing court might approach the di-
lemma created by Utah's ban, some doctrinal background is necessary to 
explain the Court's current approach to student speech. The Court's 
four major cases in the area-Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District,24 Board of Education v. Pico,25 Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser,26 and Hazelwood-provide a starting 
point for examining the difficult constitutional issues raised by the crea-
tion and continued presence of queer student organizations in public 
high schools. 
The Supreme Court's student speech jurisprudence has developed 
along three distinct yet highly interrelated paths. First, the Court's dis-
cussion about the mission of American education shifted emphasis to 
stress public education's role in the inculcation of values,27 while de-
emphasizing education's role in fostering independent thought. Second, 
the Court increased the level of deference accorded to school authorities 
in their decision to restrict student speech.28 Third, the Court introduced 
public forum doctrine as the operative mode of analysis for most 
24. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
25. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
26. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
27. See id. at 681 (identifying "society's ... interest in teaching students the boundaries of 
socially appropriate behavior"); Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1540 (7th Cir. 
1996) (recognizing school concerns with "the inculcation of civility (including manners) and 
traditional moral, social, and political norms"); Virgil v. School Bd., 862 F.2d 1517, 1520 (I Ith Cir. 
1989) (recognizing "the central role of public schools in transmitting values necessary to the 
development of an informed citizenry"); Broussard v. School Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1536 (E.D. Va. 
1992) (recognizing school's legitimate "concern for values and decency in addition to school 
order"). This progression can be seen as a philosophical evolution from the pedagogical perspectives 
of John Dewey to Emile Durkheim. While Dewey argued that the schools were "an environment that 
molds citizenship and prepares people for democracy," Durkheim saw in schools ''the need for social 
institutions to establish a core of consistent homogenizing values as a basis to enable children to 
develop their own autonomy." Michael Rebell, Tinker, Hazelwood and the Remedial Role of the 
Courts in Education Litigation, 69 ST. JOHN'S L REV. 539, 544-45 (1995). 
28. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267. 
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student speech cases, ostensibly abandoning its earlier mission-based in-
quiry.29 The eventual result is a doctrine that is mired in needless com-
plexity and relies upon dubious facial commitments to governmental 
property interests or concerns that student speech might be attributed 
to the school. 
A. Tinker v. Des Moines 
In its initial foray into the realm of student speech, the Court fo-
cused its constitutional lens upon the mission of the school, assigning a 
mission to secondary school education and fashioning a constitutional 
test to match it. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District,30 the Court struck down the suspensions of two high 
school students and one junior high student for wearing black annbands 
to protest the Vietnam War.31 The students, all siblings, planned the 
protest in advance and were not affiliated with any school-sponsored 
organization or activity. Setting the high-water mark for student liber-
ties, the Court held that schools could prohibit student speech only if 
"engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially 
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the opera-
tion of the school. "'32 Because the lower court did not make the requi-
site finding, the symbolic speech of the annbands was entitled to 
constitutional protection. 
The Court's ruling in Tinker was one more skinnish in a long-
standing historical battle over the mission and goals of American educa-
tion .33 While some saw education as a socialization mechanism designed 
to convey selected values, others saw it as an opportunity to expose 
students to new ideas and options for the future.34 The Tinker decision 
took a clear position in the conflict, stating that "educating the young 
for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional 
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its 
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our govern-
ment as mere platitudes.ms The Court also mentioned "this Nation's 
29. See id. at 270. 
30. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
31. See id. at 514. 
32. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 747, 749 (1966)) (emphasis added). 
33. See generally AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987). 
34. See Rosemary C. Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of 
Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REV. 253, 257 (1992) {"[T]his ideology of schooling contains an inherent 
tension between individual freedom and collective interests."). For another perspective on the 
ideological history of American schooling, see Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, The 
Hazelwood Progeny: Autonomy and Student Expression in the /990's, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 379 
(1995). 
35. 393 U.S. at 507 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 
(1943)). 
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repudiation of the principle that a State might so conduct its schools as 
to 'foster a homogenous people"'36 and suggested that society can best 
discover truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any 
kind of authoritative selection."37 In addition, the Tinker Court placed a 
significant constitutional hurdle on the ability_ of school authorities by 
recognizing that "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of distur-
bancems was an insufficient institutional motive for speech regulation 
within the school community.39 
The Court did not, however, entirely abandon the notion that 
school authorities have a legitimate interest in restricting the speech of 
their students. The "material or substantial disruption" test acknowl-
edges that there is a point at which a school's disciplinary needs and 
larger objectives outweigh a student's interest in free speech. Because, 
by their very nature, material or substantial disruptions prevent mean-
ingful communication from occurring, the Tinker test is not only a 
speech-friendly constitutional approach but also reflects a constitu-
tional paradigm that sets limitations on speech that obstructs an organi-
zation's mission. If a school's mission is to foster dialogue and discourse 
as part of a search for truth, the Tinker Court argued, schools may re-
strict speech only when the speech impedes that mission. The Tinker 
test thus represents the Court's attempt to synthesize institutional re-
alities with constitutional mandates. 
B. Board of Education v. Pico 
The first chinks in the Tinker armor began to appear in Board of 
Education v. Pico,40 decided in 1982. A plurality of the Court held that 
a school district's decision to remove books from high school and junior 
high school libraries violated the First Amendment.41 The school district 
identified the books, which included Richard Wright's classic Black Boy 
and a compilation of short stories by African-American writers edited 
by Langston Hughes,42 as "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Sem[i]tic, 
and just plain filthy."43 The district went on to place the removal of the 
books in the context of an educational mission: "It is our duty, our 
moral obligation, to protect the children in our schools from this moral 
danger as surely as from physical and medical dangers."44 
36. Id. at 511 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)). 
37. Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
38. Id. at 508. 
39. Id. at 514. 
40. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
41. See id. at 872. 
42. See id. at 856-57 n.3. 
43. Id. at 857. 
44. Id. 
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The plurality opinion, one of seven in the case, "is a studied lesson 
in Court confusion and ambivalence."45 While the decision turned pri-
marily on whether the First Amendment extends to guarantee students 
access to information,46 Pico is doctrinally significant for our purposes 
in two respects. First, the Court suggested in dicta that courts should 
generally view the decisions of school districts with great deference. 
"[P]ublic education in our Nation is committed to the control of local 
and state authorities, and ... federal courts should not ordinarily 
'intervene in the daily operation of school systems.'"47 This deference 
represents a significant departure from the level of judicial scrutiny the 
Court suggested in Tinker, in which the Court presumed that speech re-
strictions were invalid unless the school could demonstrate that the 
speech would cause a material or substantial disruption. 
Second, the Court began to hint at an alternative mission for 
American education that emphasized the inculcation of specific values 
rather than the importance of exposing students to a broad range of 
intellectual and cultural perspectives. "We are therefore in full agree-
ment ... that local school boards must be permitted 'to establish and 
apply their curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values,' 
and that 'there is a legitimate and substantial community interest in 
promoting respect for authority and traditional values be they social, 
moral, or political.'"48 While the Court did not entirely abandon the 
institutional objectives outlined in Tinker, by reminding school districts 
that "the First Amendment ... does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 
orthodoxy over the classroom,"49 the Court nevertheless sowed the doc-
trinal seeds for a shift away from Tinker. 
C. Bethel School District v. Fraser 
Decided just four years after Pico, Bethel School District v. Fraser5° 
presented the Court with an opportunity to reaffirm the relevance of 
Tinker's material or substantial disruption test. At a school assembly 
convened to elect officers for student government, a student gave a 
nominating speech for a fellow student that was laced with sexual innu-
endo.51 The school responded by suspending the student for three days 
45. Salomone, supra note 34, at 264. 
46. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 868. 
47. Id. at 864 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 870 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
50. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
51. The full text of the speech is as follows: 
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is 
firm-but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. 
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and removing him from the list of candidates for graduation speaker.52 
Relying on Tinker, the district and circuit courts overturned the suspen-
sion as a violation of the student's First Amendment rights.53 
After acknowledging that the Tinker decision was still good law,54 
the Court proceeded to tear it to shreds. Embracing Pico's redefinition 
of the mission of American public education, the Court stated, "[Public 
education] must inculcate the habits and ... values in themselves con-
ducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-
government in the community and the nation."55 Backtracking on the 
question of school discretion, the Court stated that "[t]he determina-
tion of what manner of speech in the classroom or in the school assem-
bly is inappropriate properly rests with the school district."56 Ostensibly 
distinguishing Tinker as a case about political speech,57 the Court found 
that the school board had full authority to restrict "lewd and indecent" 
speech because such speech was "wholly inconsistent with the 
'fundamental values' of public school education."58 
The most surprising element of the Fraser opinion is the lack of 
an operable constitutional test. Rather than following the test it articu-
lated in Tinker, the Court conducted a Tinker-like inquiry into the mis-
sion of public school education and suggested that extending First 
Amendment rights to the school assembly would conflict with the or-
ganizational purpose of value inculcation. In so doing, the Court made 
no attempt to limit the holding to obscene speech or to provide any 
principles to guide lower courts as to when student speech impedes or-
ganizational objectives. Furthermore, the Court made no effort to con-
fine or define the continued relevance of the Tinker test.59 The Court's 
ambiguity in this area had serious implications in terms of the degree of 
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an 
issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing and 
pushing until finally-he succeeds. 
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each and every one of 
you. 
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice president-he'll never come between you and the best 
our high school can be. 
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
52. See id at 678. 
53. See id at 679-80. 
54. See id at 680. 
55. Id. at 681 (quoting c. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HtSTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
228 (1968)). 
56. Id. at 683. 
57. Id at 680. Fraser's attempt to distinguish Tinker on the basis of political speech is ultimately 
unconvincing since the student speech in Fraser occurred at a schoolwide forum on self-government. 
58. Id. at 685-86. 
59. The Court could have applied the Tinker test and still reached the desired outcome. In his 
concurrence, Justice Brennan applied the Tinker test and found the speech "disruptive" and therefore 
found the suspension constitutional. See id. at 688-90 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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discretion granted to school authorities to regulate student speech. By 
failing to clarify the appropriate standard of review, the Court implic-
itly suggested a weakness in the affirmative proof of "disturbance" re-
quired under Tinker. 60 
In sum, between 1969 and 1986, the Court consistently inquired 
into the institutional mission of American schools to determine the 
boundaries of First Amendment liberties. As the Court's articulation of 
that mission began to shift from producing independent thinkers to ar-
ticulating cultural values, the level of discretion the Court granted to 
school authorities to restrict student speech began to grow. 
II 
PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE: THE INTRODUCTION OF 
A CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO STUDENT SPEECH 
The retreat from Tinker that the Court began in Pico and Fraser 
culminated in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.61 In Hazelwood, 
the Court affirmed the constitutionality of institutional censorship of a 
school-sponsored newspaper.62 Staff members of a high school newspa-
per, the Spectrum, contested their school's decision to withhold publi-
cation of two stories. One story dealt with student experiences with 
pregnancy, the other with the impact of divorce on students in the 
school.63 Students wrote and edited the paper as part of a journalism 
course for which they received curricular credit, page proofs of each 
issue were submitted to the principal for his approval, and the local 
board supplied the majority of the operating funds for the paper.64 
In order to understand the Court's decision, it is necessary to ex-
amine briefly public forum doctrine, an analytic tool that began to as-
sume great importance in First Amendment analysis during the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts.65 Public forum doctrine focuses on creating a se-
ries of categorical tests based upon the medium or locale where the 
speech takes place. ln the process, forum analysis makes a distinction 
between viewpoint discrimination and content discrimination.66 
60. See C. Thomas Dienes & Annemargaret Connolly, When Students Speak: Judicial Review 
in the Academic Marketplace, 7 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 343, 367 (1989) ("[A]t best, the Chief 
Justice urged a rationality standard of review; alternatively, he urged complete judicial abdication of 
first amendment review."). 
61. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
62. See id at 262. 
63. See id at 263. 
64. See id at 262-63. 
65. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985); Perry 
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). The doctrine can be traced to two 
sources: Harry Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. Cr. REV. I 
(1965) and Hague v. C!O, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
66. The Court's current approach to First Amendment doctrine evaluates regulations on speech 
1998] QUEER STUDENT GROUPS 1141 
Viewpoint discrimination is subject to strict constitutional scrutiny re-
gardless of the forum classification,67 while content discrimination is 
dependent upon the nature of the forum. Forum analysis determines the 
state's ability to engage in content discrimination by dividing public 
spaces into three separate categories for the purpose of evaluating 
content-based restrictions: the public (or traditional) forum, the limited 
(or designated) public forum, and the non-public forum.68 
Traditional public forums, described as places that "by long tradi-
tion or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and de-
bate,"69 receive the highest level of constitutional protection for 
speech. In such forums, which include streets and parks, the government 
may not place absolute prohibitions on speech and may only institute 
content-based restrictions if they are "necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and ... [are] narrowly drawn to achieve that end."70 
Speech in public forums is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions.71 
The second category, the limited public forum, is created when a 
government entity opens its property for use as a place of expressive 
activity for a limited amount of time or for a limited class of speakers.72 
For example, in Widmar v. Vincent,13 the Court held that a university 
created a limited public forum for student groups that wished to meet on 
campus.74 In identifying limited public fornms, the Court does not look 
to the tradition of the forum, but to ''the policy and practice of the 
government.ms If the government has established the confines of the 
forum, and the speech falls within the purpose of the forum, content-
based restrictions are subject to the same scrutiny as in traditional public 
forums.76 
depending upon whether they seek to regulate the content or viewpoint of the speech. Content-based 
discrimination targets the subject matter of the speech while viewpoint discrimination targets the 
speaker's views on the subject. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 830-31 (1995). 
67. See id. ("Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be 
unconstitutional."). 
68. A comprehensive analysis or critique of public forum doctrine is beyond the scope of this 
Comment For analyses and critiques of public forum doctrine, see generally Post, Between 
Governance and Management, supra note 19; Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading 
Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L . 
REV. 1219 (1984). 
69. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
70. Id. 
71. See id. and cases cited. 
72. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. 
73. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
74. See id. at 277. 
75. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) 
(emphasis added); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988). 
76. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). 
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All other forums are considered non-public. Within this category, 
the government may place restrictions "based on subject matter and 
speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light 
of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.m7 The 
government's rationale does not need to be the "most reasonable or the 
only reasonable limitation."78 Most important, unlike the other catego-
ries, "a finding of strict incompatibility between the nature of the 
speech or the identity of the speaker and the functioning of the non-
public forum is not mandated."79 
ill 
Haze/wood's REASONING AND ANALYSIS 
Hazelwood represents the Court's definitive attempt to reconcile 
two conflicting doctrinal objectives established by precedent. On one 
hand, Justice White's opinion began with the oft-quoted observation 
from Tinker that public school students "do not 'shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate'"80 and affirmed that schools may not sanction students "merely 
for expressing their personal views on the school premises"81 unless the 
school satisfies the demands of the Tinker test. At the same time, the 
Court went on to validate the primary tenets of Fraser: Schools need 
not tolerate speech that threatens the school's mission,82 and school 
boards have peremptory authority to determine the scope of permissi-
ble speech "in the classroom or in school assembly."83 
Haze/wood's attempt at reconciling precedent involved the use of 
two fundamentally flawed and highly interrelated concepts: public forum 
doctrine and a constitutional dichotomy between "school-sponsored" 
and "school-tolerated"84 speech. A critique of both concepts reveals a 
school speech doctrine that is almost impossible to apply with any sort 
of constitutional consistency and without threatening the integrity of 
core First Amendment values. 
77. Cornelius, 413 U.S. at 806. 
78. Id. at 808. 
79. Id. 
80. 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
506 (1969)). 
81. Id. 
82. See id. at 266; see also id. at 272 ("Otherwise, the schools would be unduly constrained 
from fulfilling their role as 'a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment."') (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
83. Id. at 267 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)). 
84. See Rosemary C. Salomone, Public Forum Doctrine and the Perils of Categorical Thinking: 
Lessons.from Lamb's Chapel, 24 N.M. L. REV. I, 19 (1994). 
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A. Hazelwood 's Use of Public Forum Doctrine 
For the first time in a case involving student speech, the Court ap-
plied public forum analysis to determine whether speech is constitution-
ally protected. Examining the Spectrum, the Court identified the paper 
as a non-public forum because there was no evidence of school policy or 
practice "to open the pages of Spectrum to 'indiscriminate use' ... by 
its student reporters and editors, or by the student body generally."85 As 
part of its inquiry into the paper's role as a vehicle for self-expression, 
the Court relied on the paper's close relationship to the school curricu-
lum and the trial court's finding that the journalism teacher and the 
principal had final authority over the content of the paper. 86 
By applying public forum doctrine in Hazelwood, the Court utilized 
an analysis that was developed to answer one question-whether the 
government must grant equal access to government property and media 
for external speakers-to answer a very different question: whether 
speakers from within the school environment are entitled to protection 
from content- and viewpoint-based discrimination.87 The two circum-
stances involve fundamentally different constitutional considerations. 
When applying public forum doctrine to external speakers, the 
Court has consistently focused on the government's ownership of the 
property to justify content-based regulation.88 "[T]he state, no less than 
a private owner of property, has the power to preserve the property 
under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."89 If the 
government dedicates the property to free expression, either by policy 
or tradition, the state is restricted from engaging in content-based ex-
clusions. Otherwise, public forum doctrine treats the government like 
any other private business, with wide latitude to restrict speech based 
upon content.90 
With internal speecli, the rationale used to justify exclusion of out-
side speakers under public forum doctrine becomes highly suspect. If 
government's power to regulate speech under public forum doctrine is 
directly tied to government ownership of property, this would suggest 
that the government has nearly unlimited ability to impose content 
regulations on individuals that spend the bulk of their time, as 
85. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270. 
86. See id. at 268-69. 
87. See supra note 66 for an explanation of the distinction between content- and viewpoint-
based discrimination. See generally Post, Between Governance and Management, supra note 19. · 
88. See id. at 1766. 
89. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (quoting Greer 
v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)). For a critique of the Court's focus on property rights, see 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 821-22 (1985) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting) ("[T]he mere fact that the Government acts as property owner should not exempt it 
from the First Amendment."). 
90. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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government employees or as students, on government property that is 
not a designated public forum. Suppose, for example, that the 
Department of Health ap.d Human Services, concerned that its employ-
ees are not spending enough time discussing the major social problems 
of the day, barred all of its employees, when on HHS property and en-
gaging in HHS business, from any and all speech related to the topics of 
sports and entertainment. Courts would likely find this type of content-
based regulation of internal speech unconstitutional.91 But why? If we 
accept that the State may engage in content-based exclusion of internal 
speakers merely because it owns the property, such a regulation-
whether it involves HHS, the Tinker armbands, or queer student 
groups-should withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
The application of public forum doctrine to internal speech leads 
to skewed constitutional outcomes. By applying a doctrine whose ra-
tionale is based on the government's role as a property owner to cases 
where the government functions as an employer or as a provider of so-
cial communities, courts are destined to overlook constitutional values 
of free expression and open political discourse. The potential for unde-
sirable outcomes forced the Hazelwood Court to explore creative con-
stitutional alternatives, adding confusion to an already muddled area of 
law. 
B. Hazelwood and School-Sponsored Speech 
Taken by itself, the use of public forum doctrine in Hazelwood 
likely would have overruled Tinker.92 If internal speech, without regard 
to the affiliation of the speaker, was regulated within the broad confines 
of the non-public forum, the school would have the same right to regu-
late student armbands as it would have to deny access to an Avon lady 
who wants to make an on-site presentation to faculty and staff. 
To avoid this outcome, the Hazelwood Court added a school-
specific corollary to its application of public forum doctrine. Addressing 
the question it avoided in Fraser, the Court clarified the scope of the 
Tinker test by making a crucial distinction between school-sponsored 
and school-tolerated speech. The Court restricted application of the 
Tinker test to school-tolerated speech, defined as "a student's personal 
expression that happens to occur on the school premises."93 Hazelwood, 
alternatively, dealt with school-sponsored speech, "educators' authority 
91. This is, obviously, an overly simplistic example. In an educational context, a court would 
likely decide this type of case under Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), examining 
whether the school employee's relationship with the local board was close enough to require 
"personal loyalty and confidence" in order to function properly. Id at 570. 
92. See Cornelius, 413 U.S. at 823 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court's 
application of public forum doctrine would overrule Tinker). 
93. Haze/wood, 484 U.S. at 271. 
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over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other 
expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public 
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.'>94 
The Court defined the scope of school-sponsored speech to include 
any activity, inside or outside a traditional classroom setting, that is 
"supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular 
knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences."95 Hence, the 
Tinker test is not applicable to determine ''when a school may refuse to 
lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student expres-
sion. "96 High schools can engage in speech regulation connected to 
"school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are rea-
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."97 By making the 
degree of constitutional scrutiny dependent upon school sponsorship, 
the Hazelwood Court saved Tinker from the fatal effects of public fo-
rum doctrine. The end result, however, only replaced one doctrinal tan-
gle with another. 
The problematic questions raised by the use of school sponsorship 
as a governing constitutional principle are readily apparent in the case 
of high school student organizations. Should the Court have decided 
Tinker differently if the Tinker children's protest had been part of an 
activity sponsored by the "Oppose the Vietnam War" club at school? 
Would constitutional protection for such a club hinge on whether a fac-
ulty member supervised a protest organized by the club? Or whether the 
school established the club for the ostensible purpose of imparting par-
ticular leadership and organizing skills? Are voluntary extracurricular 
student organizations fundamentally different from the schoolwide as-
sembly in Fraser or the newspaper in Hazelwood, which was distributed 
throughout the school? Furthermore, how should a court analyze an ex-
tracurricular queer student group's decision to wear pink triangles in 
class? 
In sum, the Hazelwood Court introduced two significant doctrinal 
elements into the dialogue over constitutional protections for student 
speech. First, Hazelwood applied public forum doctrine to inl:ra-
organizational speech, even though the doctrine was developed to es-
tablish constitutional boundaries for access by outsiders to government 
property. Second, by utilizing the sponsorship/toleration distinction to 
determine the degree of First Amendment protection, the Court osten-
sibly abandoned the mission-based analysis it had advanced in previous 
cases in favor of a hybrid categorical analysis. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at272-73. 
97. Id. at273. 
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IV 
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE TO STUDENT CLUBS 
While Haze/wood's emphasis on public forum doctrine and school 
sponsorship severely limited Tinker's reach, existing doctrine offers stu-
dent clubs some limited hope for First Amendment protection. In this 
Part, I apply both public forum doctrine and Hazelwood to a ban on 
student clubs in order to elaborate on some of the doctrinal problems 
addressed earlier as well as to suggest ways that courts addressing regula-
tions on student clubs might distinguish Hazelwood. 
A. Public Forum Doctrine and Student Clubs 
Despite their divergent outcomes, Tinker and Fraser adopted simi-
lar approaches to First Amendment questions. Both cases inquired into 
the mission of an educational institution as a mechanism for determin-
ing the relative strength of the school's interest in restricting speech. 
The Court then based its decision upon the degree to which the speech 
threatened the mission. Public forum doctrine ostensibly supplants this 
approach because it centers its constitutional inquiry not on govern-
mental interests and objectives, but on the medium or locale where the 
speech takes place.98 
To understand public forum doctrine's potentially lethal conse-
quences for speech in an educational environment, consider the case of 
queer student clubs. The doctrine offers the clubs two potential safe har-
bors that have succeeded in post-secondary environments, but both are 
fraught with problems. At the same time, both solutions pinpoint prob-
lems inherent in public forum doctrine: the definition of the "limited 
public forum" and the scope of the ban on viewpoint discrimination. 
First, the clubs may argue that student clubs are a limited public fo-
rum, and the school therefore may not engage in content- or 
viewpoint-based discrimination. Indeed, this argument has worked with 
great success in a college context,99 providing First Amendment protec-
tion to queer student groups at universities. 100 More importantly, 
Hazelwood itself contains language suggesting that the use of school 
facilities by student groups might constitute a limited public forum. 101 
98. See Post, Between Governance and Management, supra note 19, at 1765-66. 
99. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (overturning university policy of 
excluding religious groups from university facilities). 
100. See, e.g., Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543 (I Ith Cir. 1997) (holding 
statute prohibiting recognition of queer student group unconstitutional). 
101. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267 ("[S]chool facilities may be deemed to be public forums 
only if school authorities have 'by policy or by practice' opened those facilities 'for indicriminate use 
by the general public,' or by some segment of the public, such as student organizations." (quoting 
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983) (emphasis added))); see 
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Unfortunately, the Court's definition of the "limited public forum" 
category has rendered it all but meaningless. 102 If, as the Court asserts, a 
high school, or any other government institution, can create and define 
the scope of the limited public forum through its "policy and prac-
tice, mo3 a school district or the state legislature may simply include con-
tent-based exclusions in the definition of the forum, as Utah did with 
clubs that "involve human sexuality." Under public forum doctrine, 
courts could easily consider the Utah statute as an indication of the 
state's "policy and practice"toward excluding student organizations that 
"involve human sexuality," effectively removing such clubs from the 
class of speakers entitled to the limited public forum's heightened con-
stitutional scrutiny. As a result, it is increasingly difficult to determine 
whether the "limited public forum" category has any real constitutional 
significance, or if it has become part and parcel of the "non-public fo-
rum." 
Second, even if a court treated student clubs as non-public forums, a 
queer club may still argue that a ban on clubs that address human sexual-
ity constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination. The Court has 
already accepted a parallel argument in the context of college clubs, 
striking down the University of Virginia's denial of funding to a 
Christian student organization in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of 
the University of Virginia. 104 The Court's reliance, however, on view-
point discrimination, regardless of the educational setting or the out-
come for student groups, is misplaced because it is impossible to apply 
the ban on viewpoint discrimination in a consistent and principled 
manner. 
The fact remains that the contemporary American high school is a 
rich gold mine of viewpoint discrimination.105 Consider schoolwide as-
semblies on a particular topic or classroom assignments that ask 
also Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7 (stating that institutions may create public forums for use by student 
groups). 
102. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 825 (1985) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting): 
The Court makes it virtually impossible to prove that a forum restricted to a particular class 
of speakers is a limited public forum. If the Government does not create a limited public 
forum unless it intends to provide an 'open forum' for expressive activity, and if the 
exclusion of some speakers is evidence that the Government did not intend to create such a 
forum, no speaker challenging denial of access will ever be able to prove that the forum is 
a limited public forum. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
103. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; see also Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270. 
104. 515 U.S. 8I9 (1995). While a ban on clubs that address human sexuality would seem to 
constitute content discrimination, the Rosenberger Court held that a policy denying funding to a 
student group that manifests a "belief in or about a deity or ultimate reality" constituted viewpoint 
discrimination. Id. at 836. In the process, the Court recognized that the distinction between content 
and viewpoint discrimination is "not a precise one." Id. at 831. 
105. See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 15I, 165-67 {1996). 
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students to take a particular position, like "Why Capitalism Promotes 
Economic Efficiency." The assignment, though likely to survive consti-
tutional scrutiny,106 clearly violates the constitutional ban on viewpoint 
discrimination because it effectively silences those with other view-
points on the comparative merits of capitalism. If the Court were truly 
serious about imposing an absolute ban on viewpoint discrimination, 
educational pedagogy as we know it would cease to exist. While at-
tempts to justify protection for controversial high school student or-
ganizations based upon the categorical ban on viewpoint discrimination 
are doctrinally possible, such claims are particularly tenuous given the 
unique nature of the school environment. 
B. Hazelwood and Student Clubs 
The Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed the constitu-
tional free speech rights of extracurricular high school clubs. Moreover, 
the Equal Access Act has enabled lower courts to dispose of student club 
cases involving speech regulations on statutory grounds, 107 allowing 
those courts to avoid ruling on any constitutional claim. Nevertheless, 
there are some potential ways to distinguish Haze/wood's definition of 
sponsorship and place student groups within Tinker's protective um-
brella. 
Most noticeably, the newspaper in Hazelwood was part of a jour-
nalism class for which the students received curricular credit.108 The fac-
ulty adviser and principal were actively involved in the editorial 
process, and the paper was widely distributed throughout the school. 109 
In contrast, most student clubs do not implicate these indicia of spon-
sorship to the same degree. Curricular credit is rarely granted for student 
club activity, and instirutional review of the speech of student clubs is, 
in most cases, comparatively minimal. 
Because Hazelwood offers such a broad definition of sponsorship, 
however, courts cannot easily dismiss it. Hazelwood extends its reach 
beyond standard curricular speech to "school-sponsored publications, 
theatrical productions, and expressive activities that students, parents, 
and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the im-
primatur of the school."110 If a school district can show that a club's ac-
tivities "are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart 
106. See, e.g., Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
assigning a student a grade of zero for a proposed paper on the life of Jesus Christ did not violate the 
student's free speech rights). 
107. See supra note 23. 
108. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262. 
109. See id. at 261-62. 
110. Id. at 271. 
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particular knowledge or skills to student participants,"111 then a review-
ing court would have to utilize Haze/wood's limited conception of con-
stitutional scrutiny. Furthermore, some lower courts have shown a 
willingness to extend Hazelwood beyond the confines of curricular 
speech. 112 
C. The Interplay between Public Forum Doctrine and Sponsorship 
The overlap between the sponsorship/toleration distinction and 
public forum doctrine has been the subject of significant disagreement 
among lower courts. In cases where the school demonstrates sponsor-
ship, courts have either conducted a forum analysis113 or simply applied 
the Hazelwood test and dispensed with forum analysis entirely.114 In ei-
ther approach, the outcome was fairly predictable, as the First 
Amendment places few limits on the ability of schools to regulate 
school-sponsored speech. 
In cases involving the personal speech of students ("Tinker" 
speech), however, courts have split on whether or not Tinker preempts 
a forum-based inquiry.115 Because Tinker and public forum doctrine adopt 
dramatically different perspectives on the appropriate degree of judicial 
deference, the applicable test has a significant impact on the First 
Amendment rights of students who engage in non-school-sponsored 
speech on school grounds. Several courts have applied forum analysis to 
non-school-sponsored speech, 116 examining whether or not restrictions 
on non-school sponsored speech are permissible in specific areas of the 
111. Id. 
112. See, e.g., Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that school did not 
violate FirstAmendment by banning the school's "Johnny Reb" symbol); C.H. v. Oliva, 990 F. Supp. 
341, 352-54 (D.N.J. 1997) (applying Hazelwood to find that school did not violate First Amendment by 
moving student's poster of Jesus to a less prominent location). 
113. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood ofS. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist, 941 F.2d 817 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (en bane) (holding that a school-sponsored yearbook was permitted to reject 
advertisements by Planned Parenthood because the yearbook was a non-public forum). 
114. See, e.g., Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995); Poling v. Murphy, 
872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that disqualification of candidate for student council president 
for insulting assistant principal in campaign speech did not violate the First Amendment); Crosby, 852 
F.2d 801. There is no substantive difference between the two tests, since they both demand a 
reasonable relationship between the regulation on speech and the purpose served by the forum. In the 
case of schools, the purpose is to address "legitimate pedagogical concerns." Searcey v. Harris, 888 
F.2d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273) (stating that there is no 
difference between the two tests). However, the Court has given some recent indications that this 
distinction may be meaningful with respect to the ability of school districts to engage in viewpoint 
discrimination. See infra note 144. 
115. See Salomone, supra note 34, at 274-92. 
116. See, e.g., Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
because an elementary school is a non-public forum, the school did not violate a fourth-grader's First 
Amendment rights by forbidding him from distributing invitations to a church function on school 
grounds). 
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school, like school hallways. 117 Others have ignored public forum doc-
trine altogether and applied the Tinker test, implicitly reasoning that 
public forum doctrine is restricted to questions of access, not to those of 
students' personal expression in places where they are already entitled 
to be. 118 While the resolution of this conflict is beyond the scope of this 
Comment, the problem is demonstrative of the confusion that has ac-
companied the application of a doctrine that deals with external access 
to public space to the workings of an internally driven community.1 19 
v 
A CRITIQUE OF SCHOOL SPONSORSHIP 
Because Haze/wood's applicability to extracurricular student clubs 
is somewhat ambiguous, it is necessary for reviewing courts to examine 
the underlying motivations behind the opinion. In this Part, I consider 
the tremendous emphasis the Hazelwood Court placed on the issue of 
sponsorship and question why the issue of sponsorship should have any 
constitutional significance at all. I offer two likely rationales and ex-
plain why both fail to justify the use of sponsorship as a determinative 
factor in school speech cases. 
Under the first rationale, which I will call the "proprietary" justifi-
cation, 120 sponsorship is significant because the school has a right to re-
strict speech based on its interest in the property upon which the 
speech takes place or based on the school's ability to allocate its own 
resources. As suggested earlier, this concept functions as the guiding as-
sumption behind public forum doctrine.121 Under the second, which I will 
call the "attribution"rationale, schools attempt to justify content-based 
exclusions of "school-sponsored" speech because the school, like any 
individual or organization, may decide with what speech it chooses to 
affiliate itself. 
117. See Hemry v. School Bd. of Colo. Springs Sch. Dist No. II, 760 F. Supp. 856 (D. Colo. 
I991) (upholding school's restriction on student distribution of religious newspaper in school 
hallways). 
118. See, e.g., Chandler v. McMinnaville Sch. Dist, 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
suspension of students for their refusal to remove buttons containing the word "scab" to support 
teachers' strike violated First Amendment); Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding 
unconstitutional a school policy requiring pre-distribution school approval of all student-written 
materials as applied to unauthorized student-written newspaper); Chalifoux v. New Caney lndep. 
Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (upholding students' First Amendment right to wear 
rosaries as necklaces). But see Broussard v. School Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1537 (E.D. Va. 1992) 
(applying Tinker test to find no First Amendment violation in school's decision to suspend student for 
wearing T-shirt saying "Drugs Suck!"). 
119. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
120. See generally Post, Between Governance and Management, supra note 19. 
121. See supra Part 111.A. 
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A. Proprietary Justification 
As applied to the question of queer student groups, the proprietary 
rationale goes something like this: Because the school district owns the 
property on which the club wishes to meet, and because the school sup-
plies resources to the club, the district, as a property owner or resource 
provider, is entitled to preserve the property for its intended uses. Thus, 
queer student groups have no constitutional rights to meet on school 
property during school hours.122 The Court has invoked this general 
type of rationale on many occasions, primarily in the context of public 
forum doctrine, to explain the government's ability to deny access to 
property .123 
For the same reasons that the proprietary rationale fails in the 
public forum context, it cannot explain the Hazelwood Court's preoc-
cupation with sponsorship. If the sole justification for sponsorship were 
to protect the government's property rights, the Court would have 
subjected the speech of the Tinker children to regulation merely because 
the school supplied the classroom where the speech took place. Conse-
quently, any student club or organization meeting on school property or 
using school resources to facilitate speech would be subject to nearly 
limitless regulation. The proprietary justification, if taken at face value, 
recognizes no distinction between personal expression in a school 
lunchroom and speech that somehow implicates the school. If taken to 
its logical conclusion, this justification would allow a school, in the 
name of promoting its desired values, to expend its resources to allow 
only students with family incomes above $50,000 to participate in stu-
dent clubs or to allow only the school Democratic club to meet.124 These 
types of hypothetical regulations, which present clear constitutional 
problems, suggest that a school should not have a nearly unlimited 
122. The question of whether queer student groups can meet after school on school property is a 
fundamentally different question. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist, 508 
U.S. 384 (1993) (holding unconstitutional school's denial of church's request to use school facilities 
for film series); Good News/Good Sports Club v. School Dist, 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(overturning school policy forbidding access to student religious club after school as impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination); Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907F.2d1366 (3d Cir. 1990) (upholding 
preliminary iajunction forcing school to allow student religious organization to rent out the school 
auditorium after school). 
123. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 390 ("There is no question that the District, like the 
private owner of property, may legally preserve the property under its control for the use to which it 
is dedicated." (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 
(1985))). 
124. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870-71 (1982) ("If a Democratic school board, 
motivated by party affiliation, ordered the removal of all books written by or in favor of Republicans, 
few would doubt that the order violated the constitutional rights of the students .... "). While some 
might view the latter regulation as impermissible viewpoint discrimination, subsequent interpretations 
of Hazelwood suggest that school sponsorship allows schools to engage in viewpoint discrimination. 
See infra note 144. 
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license to engage in speech regulation solely based on a proprietary jus-
tification. 
B. Attribution Rationale 
Under the attribution rationale, queer student groups have limited 
First Amendment rights because external observers and members of the 
school community may perceive the students' speech as the speech of 
the school. Because the Constitution grants broad latitude for the gov-
ernment to select which messages it wishes to convey when the gov-
ernmental entity is the speaker,125 the school could easily subject the 
club to regulation. However, the rationale fails to account for the fu11 
scope of a school's authority to regulate student speech. In addition, the 
justification does not account for the organizational relationship be-
tween clubs and schools and does not adequately explain the doctrinal 
distinction the Court has drawn between student speech rights in high 
schools and universities. 
1. Underinc/usion: The Risk of Attribution Fails to Explain the Full 
Scope of the School's Regulatory Power 
Taken by itself, the attribution rationale cannot justify the level of 
discretion granted to school authorities because the rationale is under-
inclusive. Consider the following hypothetical interaction in a high 
school biology class: 
Teacher: What does Darwin's theory of evolution say? 
Student: I know I am just expressing my own opinion here, 
but I would suggest that everything Darwin said about evolution 
is wrong. God created the universe and human beings, and evolu-
tion is a bunch of lies. 
Teacher: That's not what I'm looking for, and I would appre-
ciate it if you didn't bring that issue up again [effectively si-
lencing the student]. 
Under current doctrine, schools retain the power to regulate such 
in-class student statements made during the course of an academic ex-
change, 126 much like the newspaper in Hazelwood, even though the stu-
dent has added a disclaimer, and there is little danger that anyone would 
attribute the student's statement to the school. For in-class dialogues, 
the risk of attribution is almost non-existent, but the power of school 
authorities remains paramount. Clearly, the rationale is underinclusive 
125. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
126. See Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995); C.H. v. Oliva, 990 F. 
Supp. 341, 352-54 (D.N.J. 1997) (finding that school district did not violate First Amendment by 
preventing student from reading children's Bible story to his classmates). 
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because it fails to explain the full scope of the school's authority to 
regulate school-sponsored speech, including the speech of student clubs. 
2. The Attribution Rationale Fails to Account for the Organizational 
Relationship Between Student Clubs and Their Schools 
When applied to student clubs, the attribution rationale ignores the 
organizational relationship between student clubs and their parent insti-
tutions. By and large, participation in a particular club is a voluntary act 
initiated by an individual student.127 Students, not faculty members or 
school administrators, define the organization's agenda, allocate funds, 
organize activities, elect officers, and schedule meetings. The existence 
of a faculty sponsor, whose role is usually advisory and is designed to 
minimize tort liability from injuries to person or property, is insuffi-
cient to implicate the school. If faculty presence alone were sufficient 
to justify speech regulation, the presence of faculty members during 
lunch recess or during the Tinker students' protest would justify speech 
restrictions. Furthermore, schools routinely permit student groups with 
divergent or conflicting objectives to meet without adopting either 
group's position. 
Unlike the student speech at issue in Hazelwood or Fraser, student 
organizations do not generally involve speech aimed at, or distributed 
to, the entire student body.128 Consequently, the risks of implying 
school sponsorship of the speech are dramatically minimized, as the 
communication is only among students who are voluntary partici-
pants.129 Additionally, in contrast to the newspaper in Hazelwood, queer 
student clubs have no connection to the school's curriculum. Hazelwood 
involved a journalism class for which participants received curricular 
credit, perhaps the most tangible representation of the school's impri-
matur. The average student club, like the stamp club or the Future 
Farmers of America, has a comparatively distant relationship to the 
school's curriculum, which lessens the risk of attribution and provides 
courts with a means for distinguishing Hazelwood. 
127. This assumes that participation in student groups is voluntary and that the governance of the 
clubs and content of the meetings is in the hands of students. These two criteria are crucial. If either 
one is not satisfied, the student clubs become more like an academic classroom where student 
attendance is mandatory and the curriculum is controlled by the institution. 
128. See D. Jarrett Arp, Beyond Mergens: Balancing A Student's Free Speech Right Against the 
Establishment Clause in Public High School Equal Access Cases, 32 WM. & MARY L REV. 127, 134 
(1990). While it is true that many student organizations post fliers or advertisements targeting the 
entire school community, the bulk of speech activity within clubs generally occurs in more private 
and contained settings. 
129. Cf. Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, n3 {2d Cir. 1994) 
{distinguishing between curricular materials and library resources based upon the voluntariness of 
student exposure). 
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Recognizing the potential for a narrow interpretation of 
Hazelwood, some lower courts have scrutinized the organizational rela-
tionship between the school and the club in order to avoid the confines 
of Hazelwood's limited definition of student speech rights. For exam-
ple, in Clark v. Dallas Independent School District, 130 a district court 
upheld the right of a student-initiated religious club to meet before 
school, overturning the school district's categorical ban on religious stu-
dent organizations. The court applied the Tinker test, distinguishing 
Hazelwood based upon its finding that "[t]he conduct at issue was vol-
untaiy, student-initiated, and free from the imprimatur of school in-
volvement."131 
3. The Attribution Rationale Fails to Account for Doctrinal 
Distinctions between High Schools and Colleges 
Tiying to understand the Court's preoccupation with sponsorship 
becomes even more difficult when one contrasts Hazelwood with the 
Court's major rulings upholding the First Amendment rights of college 
student clubs. In a pair of decisions, Widmar v. Vincent132 and 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 133 the 
Court supported the rights of religious student organizations to meet 
and receive funding from universities, despite sponsorship conditions in 
a college context that were substantially identical to those of the aver-
age high school. Sponsorship, as a governing principle for student 
speech, is therefore insufficient to explain the differences between the 
First Amendment rights of high school and college students. 
a. Widmar and Hazelwood 
In Widmar v. Vincent, the Court overturned a state university's 
policy of excluding student religious groups from using university facili-
ties.134 Reasoning that the university had created a limited public forum 
for student groups without any explicit intent to do so, 135 the Court held 
that the university's regulation could not withstand the heightened con-
stitutional scrutiny that attaches to such forums. 136 
If university ownership of property or attribution risks were not 
sufficient to allow for regulation of internal speech in Widmar, it is dif-
ficult to accept either rationale as the principle governing sponsorship 
in Hazelwood. Furthermore, Widmar holds that educational institutions 
130. 806 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Tex. 1992). 
131. Id. at 120. 
132. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
133. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
134. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277. 
135. See id. at 267-68. 
13 6. See id. at 269-77. 
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can unintentionally create a limited public forum for student groups de-
spite a "policy and practice" of excluding religious organizations, while 
Hazelwood suggests that the school's policies and practices are defini-
tive in judicial attempts to determine whether a limited public forum 
exists.137 The result of these cases leaves a court reviewing school 
speech restrictions without a principled means for dealing with the con-
stitutional rules applicable to high school student organizations under 
the public forum doctrine or sponsorship analysis. Either Widmar has 
no application to high schools despite similar sponsorship conditions, 
or public high schools can unintentionally create a limited public forum 
for student organizations in spite of existing policies and practices. 
Recognizing the potential for conflict in its treatment of high 
schools and colleges, the Widmar Court limited the scope of its holding 
in dicta by stating that "First Amendment rights must be analyzed 'in 
light of the special characteristics of the school environment"ms and 
noting that college students are "less impressionable than younger stu-
dents. "139 Despite the Court's limited attempts at creating a distinction, 
however, the question of Widmar's applicability to public schools has 
been the subject of extensive debate among the lower courts.140 Passage 
of the Equal Access Act, 141 designed to apply the Widmar decision statu-
torily to secondary schools, has not clarified Widmar's applicability to 
public high schools in a constitutional context. 
One can reconcile Widmar and Hazelwood, however, once consid-
erations of forum classification and sponsorship are abandoned. The 
central difference between the two cases is the Court's explanation of 
the respective missions of universities and high schools. If the Court 
accepts that the proper inquiry is not whether the speech is "school-
sponsored" or the nature of the forum, but whether the speech repre-
sents a threat to the institutional mission, Widmar and Hazelwood fit 
137. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267. 
138. Widmar, 454 U.S. at268 n.S. (quoting Tinkerv. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 
506 (1969)). 
139. Id. at 274 n.14; see also Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1538 (7th Cir. 
1996) ("Age is a critical factor in student speech cases."). 
140. Lower courts have used the Widmar decision to find limited public forums in high schools in 
a number of different contexts. See Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist, 766 F.2d 1391, 1401 (10th Cir. 
1985) (using Widmar to find a limited public forum in an elementary and secondary school); Bender 
v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 741F.2d538, 547 (3d Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 
534 (1986) (holding that high school created limited public forum for extracurricular student groups 
and stating, "The fact that Widmar involved a university, while we here are concerned with a high 
school, does not mean that we are free to ignore the nature of the free speech rights enjoyed by 
students."). But see Ceniceros v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1535, 1546 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(holding Widmar inapplicable in an Establishment Clause context); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. 
Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding Widmar inapplicable to a 
public school district). 
141. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1994). 
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together quite nicely. In Widmar, the Court simply found the restric-
tions incompatible with the mission of higher education to promote 
intellectual dialogue and debate. In Hazelwood, the Court dealt with a 
different mission at the secondary school level and found the restriction 
consistent with larger objectives of value inculcation. 
b. Rosenberger: Student Clubs and Governmental Speech 
In Rosenberger, the Court struck down the University of Virginia's 
policy of denying funding to student groups that promoted or mani-
fested beliefs "in or about a deity or ultimate reality."142 The 
Rosenberger majority held that governmental expenditure of resources 
to student organizations to encourage a diversity of viewpoints must 
conform to higher constitutional safeguards for free speech, including a 
ban on viewpoint discrimination.143 Curiously, both the majority and 
dissent relied on Hazelwood for the proposition that the government 
may engage in both content and viewpoint discrimination with respect 
to its own speech. 144 
Two relevant insights emerge from Rosenberger's use of 
Hazelwood. First, the fact that the Rosenberger Court regarded the 
Hazelwood newspaper's speech as the speech of the school shows that 
the Court views attribution as the governing rationale behind school 
sponsorship.145 Second, by suggesting that schools may engage in view-
point-based as well as content-based discrimination, the Court indicates 
that public forum doctrine, which subjects viewpoint discrimination to 
142. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 825 (1995). 
143. See id at 836-37. 
144. See id at 834 (citing Hazelwood for the proposition that "[a] holding that the University 
may not discriminate based on the viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does not 
restrict the University's own speech, which is controlled by different principles"); id at 892-93 n.11 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (using Hazelwood to voice agreement with majority's distinction between "a 
State's use of public funds to advance its own speech and the State's funding of private speech, 
suggesting that authority to make content-related choices is at its most powerful when the State 
undertakes the former"). Rosenberger's use of Hazelwood reflects the Court's misunderstanding and 
current confusion over public forum doctrine and its application to internal speech. Hazelwood 
indicated that the school newspaper was a non-public forum, a designation that still carries with it a 
restriction against viewpoint discrimination. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 268-70. However, under the 
Court's revisionist history, the nature of the forum appears to be irrelevant and schools may engage in 
content and viewpoint discrimination once sponsorship is demonstrated. See Muller v. Jefferson 
Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1542 (7th Cir. 1996) ("(A] school need not tolerate student expression 
of viewpoints which are fundamentally 'inconsistent with its basic educational mission."' (quoting 
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266)). But see Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1319 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989) 
("Although the Supreme Court did not discuss viewpoint neutrality in Hazelwood, there is no 
indication that the Court intended to drastically rewrite First Amendment law to allow a school official 
to discriminate based upon a speaker's views .... Hazelwood acknowledges a school's ability to 
discriminate based on content not viewpoint."). 
145. See supra note 144. 
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strict scrutiny, is not relevant to high school student organizations that 
fall within the scope of Hazelwood. 
In adopting the attribution rationale, the Court assigns itself the 
task of determining whether or not the sponsorship of student clubs, 
either by providing access to school property or by providing funding, 
constitutes government speech. Again, the Court has set the scene for 
the doctrinal equivalent of an eighteen-car pileup. In both Rosenberger 
and Widmar, the Court regarded collegiate student groups as entities 
separate from the larger institution. The Court then conducted a forum 
analysis to determine the degree of constitutional scrutiny and inquired 
into the constitutionality of the content- and viewpoint-based nature of 
the institutional policies. In essence, it treated the speech of college 
student clubs as external speech within a limited public forum. If the 
attribution rationale is applied to Hazelwood, however, it appears that 
the opposite holds true in a high school environment: The speech of 
student groups is part of the speech of the school. As a result, the gov-
ernment, as speaker, may engage in both content- and viewpoint-based 
discrimination, and public forum doctrine is rendered almost irrele-
van t.146 
In order to understand just how much is at stake for queer student 
groups in the relationship between the speech of clubs and the speech of 
schools, Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor141 is particularly in-
structive. In Pryor, the Eleventh Circuit held unconstitutional an 
Alabama statute that prohibited the recognition or funding of any colle-
giate student group that "fosters or promotes a lifestyle or actions pro-
hibited by the sodomy and sexual misconduct laws.m4s Relying upon 
Rosenberger, the appellate court held that a limited public forum ex-
isted for the funding of student groups and that the statutory regulation 
on gay student groups constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimina-
tion.149 Under Rosenberger's conception of Hazelwood, a similar hold-
ing protecting the rights of a high school queer student group to meet 
would be difficult under the attribution rationale, because the govern-
ment is the speaker and is therefore permitted to engage in viewpoint 
discrimination.150 
146. See supra note 125 and accompanying text 
147. 110 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1997). 
148. Id. at 1545. 
149. See id. at 1548-50; see also Gay and Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 366-68 
(8th Cir. 1988) (overturning university's denial of funding to gay student organization as 
impermissible content-based discrimination under Widmar); Gay Students Servs. v. Texas A&M 
Univ., 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984) (overturning state university's refusal to recognize gay student 
organization). 
150. Adding to the confusion, lower courts that have chosen to apply a forum analysis to the 
speech of high school student clubs implicitly ignore the attribution rationale. By using a forum 
analysis, those holdings suggest that organized student activities do not necessarily implicate 
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If attribution alone is the only way to explain the constitutional 
importance of sponsorship, there is no principled reason to create con-
stitutional distinctions, as the Court has done, between student groups in 
high schools and colleges. In both environments, the parent institution 
provides space to meet and funding for activities. Institutionally and 
organizationally, there is little difference. Yet, in the high school con-
text, club sponsorship is considered governmental speech, while in the 
collegiate context it is not. 151 This suggests that the doctrinal distinction 
between high school and college student organizations has nothing to do 
with questions of sponsorship, governmental speech, or the nature of 
public forums, but with the Court's beliefs about the respective missions 
of secondary and post-secondary education. 
4. Mergens: Maturity and Sponsorship 
One potential explanation for the Court's decision to treat high 
schools and colleges differently is an assumption that high school stu-
dents (and, often, their parents) are not mature enough to understand 
that when a school "sponsors" a student club, it does not adopt the 
club's speech as its own or endorse the club's speech. This explanation, 
however, flies in the face of the Court's holding in Board of Education 
of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens. 152 In Mergens, the Court 
upheld an excluded high school Christian club's right to meet under the 
Equal Access Act. 153 While Mergens is not a constitutional free speech 
case, it recognized, in an Establishment Clause context, the ability of 
high school students to distinguish between school "endorsement" of 
religious speech and school toleration. 
[F]ear of a mistaken inference of endorsement is largely self-
imposed, because the school itself has control over any impres-
sions it gives its students. To the extent a school makes clear 
that its recognition of respondents' proposed club is not an en-
dorsement of the views of the club's participants, students will 
reasonably understand that the school's official recognition of 
the club evinces neutrality toward, rather than endorsement of, 
religious speech.154 
By stating that high school students are mature enough to under-
stand that the presence of a religious student organization does not 
government speech when they occur on school property. If it were government speech, there would 
be no need for a forum analysis. 
I51. Indeed, the same question can be asked of public forum doctrine. If student groups are 
limited public forums at the college level, why not at the high school level? 
152. 496 U.S. 226 (I990). 
153. See id at 253. Because the case was decided on statutory grounds, the Court declined to 
address the First Amendment free speech issue. See id 
154. Id at 25I (citation omitted). 
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constitute "endorsement" for Establishment Clause purposes, Mergens 
casts further doubt upon the attribution rationale. If high school stu-
dents are mature enough to understand that there is no "endorsement" 
under the First Amendment religion clauses, it is difficult to compre-
hend how they are not mature enough to understand lack of 
"sponsorship" for student organizations in a free speech context. Not 
only does this logic undermine Widmar's suggestion about the different 
maturity levels of high school and college students,155 but it demon-
strates yet another difficulty in identifying a doctrinally consistent gov-
erning principle that governs Hazelwood's distinction between school-
sponsored and school-tolerated speech. 
Thus far, I have argued that Hazelwood's focus on school sponsor-
ship to determine constitutional protection is without merit. In the 
next Part, I argue that the Court should return to a mission-based para-
digm for student speech and that it has implicitly followed this ap-
proach all along. 
VI 
ADOPTION OF A MISSION-BASED RATIONALE 
To rehabilitate First Amendment doctrine in secondary schools, 
the Court should abandon its current focus on school sponsorship and 
public forum doctrine. Instead, the Court should return to the course it 
adopted in Tinker, Pico, and Fraser; that is, it should conduct an inquiry 
into the institutional mission of the school and scrutinize the relation-
ship between the mission and the regulation on speech. In essence, this 
proposal adopts a similar approach to the one used in the Court's 
rights-based jurisprudence. The "governmental interest" is the pursuit of 
an organizational mission, and the "tailoring" is the relation between 
the mission and the contested regulation on speech. In adopting this 
revised focus, however, the Court should view the mission of American 
education not as an absolute dichotomy between value inculcation and 
the fostering of an independent mind, but as a continuum, recognizing 
that educational institutions often pursue both goals simultaneously. 
In looking to the mission, courts should recognize that the ultimate 
value of speech is not in its relation to doctrinally inconsistent con-. 
cerns related to property or attribution. Rather, its value derives from 
the way that freedom of speech helps or hinders our social commitment 
to public education. Implicit in this argument is a belief that the ulti-
mate value of free speech depends upon the social and organizational 
context of the speech, rather than amorphous commitments to self-
governance or a marketplace of ideas. 156 Consider, for example, speech 
155. See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text 
156. See Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, supra note 19, at 1276-77 ("Instead of 
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on a military base. The government maintains wide latitude to regulate 
speech by military personnel based upon security and discipline con-
cerns that directly relate to the organizational mission. 1s7 This includes 
speech that, in another social or organizational context, might be enti-
tled to constitutional protection against state regulation. 
When one considers the value of speech in the American high 
school, First Amendment jurisprudence should reflect the competing 
institutional concerns. On one hand, we want schools to perform their 
assigned mission free from the constricting effects of judicial review. 
Public schools exist, at least in part, to disseminate information and 
civic values determined by the political communities attached to the 
school. To fulfill that mission, schools must maintain some authority to 
constrain discourse that competes with or potentially dilutes the com-
municative product of this educational mission. Otherwise, it would be 
impossible for schools to function, with pedagogical concerns giving 
way to adolescent cacophony. 
At the same time, free speech assumes a distinctive and unique im-
portance in an educational context, protecting both institutional and 
extra-institutional values for three reasons. First, schools exist as minia-
ture communities within a larger sociopolitical community that has 
codified its values of pluralism and open political discourse into law. As 
part of their role to prepare students for civic engagement, schools 
have an institutional interest in promoting free speech in order to in-
culcate these larger social values. Second, schools have an interest in 
equipping students with the critical thinking skills necessary to partici-
pate as social and political beings in a marketplace of ideas and identi-
ties. This interest is particularly important in the American high 
school, given the formative role of adolescence in the psychological 
development of individual identity. 1ss If our teenage years play an im-
portant role in who we become as adults, exposure to a wide range of 
ideas during these years is essential to an individual's civic evolution. 
Third, schools have an interest in promoting a process of self-
realization for its own sake, above and beyond enabling individual par-
ticipation in a larger political process. The very notion of individual 
liberty suggests that there is an inherent value in the search for self-
truth, both as a necessary predicate for a larger process of collective 
aspiring to articulate abstract characteristics of speech, doctrine ought to identify discrete forms of 
social order that are imbued with constitutional value, and it ought to clarify and safeguard the ways 
in which speech facilitates that constitutional value."). 
157. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980); Post, Behveen Governance and 
Management, supra note 19, at 1770-71. 
158. See ERIK ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 261-63 (2d ed. 1963). 
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realization and as part of a utilitarian notion of maximizing individual 
happiness.159 
A mission-based test would focus the Court's attention, not on ir-
relevant proprietary or attribution concerns, but squarely on the crux of 
the matter-the reconciliation of conflicting institutional objectives 
that affect the appropriate role of free speech in an educational envi-
ronment. In fact, this focus on the institutional mission is precisely the 
approach the Court has already adopted once the sponsorship rhetoric 
is stripped away. Witness the Court's underlying preoccupation with the 
mission of American education in Tinker and Hazelwood. The Tinker 
Court arrived at its holding after identifying the mission of the school 
and determining whether or not the students' Vietnam War protest af-
fected the mission. The "Tinker test" is specifically designed to extend 
constitutional protection only to the point that the speech substantially 
affects the institution's pedagogical imperatives. Likewise, in 
Hazelwood, the Court's holding reflects a concern that unlimited jour-
nalistic discretion would severely harm the school's mission of value 
inculcation identified in Fraser and Pico. 160 Haze/wood's crucial error 
was not in protecting the school's right to engage in value inculcation 
free from judicial scrutiny. Instead, the Court erred by viewing value 
inculcation as the sole mission of secondary schools and by promulgat-
ing a constitutional test that did not demand any meaningful relation-
ship between the mission and the regulation on speech. 
Under a mission-based lens, the distinctions between the rules ap-
plied by Tinker and Hazelwood begin to blur. The difference is not the 
use of public forum doctrine or whether the speech is school sponsored. 
Instead, the cases are merely a continuation of the Court's earlier re-
evaluation of the mission of American education combined with a shift 
in the degree of judicial restraint necessary to allow schools to accom-
plish that mission. Differing conceptions of the mission of education 
also underlie the comparatively heightened scrutiny the Court applied 
to post-secondary environments in Widmar161 and Rosenberger.162 
Thus, the proper constitutional questions-even under existing 
doctrine-are the mission of the institution, the relationship between 
the mission and the regulation on speech, and the circumstances under 
159. See generally Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L REV. 591 (1982). 
160. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (envisioning the role of schools as "a principal instrument 
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in 
helping him to adjust normally to his environment" (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 
493 (1954))). 
161. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at267 n.5 ("The college classroom with its surrounding environs is 
peculiarly the marketplace of ideas." (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972))). 
162. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835 (discussing the importance of protecting First Amendment 
principles in "the University setting, where the State acts against a background of tradition and 
thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition"). 
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which the Court defers to school authorities in seeking to carry out that 
mission by regulating speech. Because of the competing missions pres-
ent in an educational context, resolution of these constitutional ques-
tions places heightened demands on courts reviewing the 
constitutionality of speech regulations of high school student clubs. 
VII 
APPLYING THE MISSION TEST TO STUDENT GROUPS 
A. What Is the Mission? 
By adopting a bipolar paradigm for identifying the institutional 
mission, the Supreme Court has skewed the constitutional analysis to 
the point that it no longer adequately addresses the real organizational 
and pedagogical issues presented by the American educational system. 
Instead of recognizing that most schools adopt a dual pedagogical mis-
sion-the inculcation of values and the fostering of an independent 
mind-the Court has implied that the mission must be either one or the 
other. 
The Court should instead view the mission of American education 
as a continuum, with value inculcation on one side and the fostering of 
an independent mind on the other. Some school activities advance the 
value inculcation mission by communicating a defined body of informa-
tion. These activities generally, but not always, include invited speakers, 
schoolwide assemblies, and most curriculum-related activities. Because 
value inculcation is part of a school's mission, courts should subject in-
stitutional regulation in these contexts to minimal judicial scrutiny in 
order for the school to achieve this objective. 
There are other school activities, however, for which the goal is 
not to codify or communicate values or information, but to encourage 
students to explore their independent identity and to define their own 
interests or passions. Student clubs serve precisely these purposes. They 
present an opportunity for students to explore interests or identities, as 
a stamp collector, a scuba diver, a Republican, a Muslim, an African 
American, or a lesbian. Far from the school dictating a code of fixed 
conduct, the objectives and areas of focus for each club are defined by 
the students. Attempting to place student clubs within the same mission 
as value-inculcating activities provides for constitutional convenience, 
but it does not accurately reflect the complexity of American educa-
tion, the diverse pedagogical objectives contained within the school en-
vironment, and the need for First Amendment protection to allow 
students to accomplish some of those objectives. 
A federal district court used similar mission-based logic to uphold 
the constitutional rights of students to distribute a non-school-
sponsored religious newspaper on school grounds in Rivera v. East Otero 
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School District R-1: 163 "High school students ... must develop the abil-
ity to understand and comment on the society in which they live and to 
develop their own sets of values and beliefs .... [I]nhibitions on indi-
vidual development defeat the very purpose of education in secondary 
schools.m64 
Furthermore, this mission-based approach finds some doctrinal ba-
sis in the concept of the limited public forum. Under that doctrine, the 
Court has recognized that institutions are capable of creating, inten-
tionally or otherwise, environments that exist to promote free expres-
sion. Consequently, their ability to regulate speech in these 
environments is limited. Unlike public forum doctrine, however, the 
mission-based test relies upon the larger institutional objectives of 
schools and the value of speech in relation to those objectives, rather 
than the stated policy and practice of the school in the particular forum 
or a distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination. 
B. When Is It Appropriate for Courts to Interfere? 
Student clubs exist at an awkward point between institutional com-
mitments to promote the exploration of individual identity and to rein-
force often hostile community values.165 Schools seeking to regulate the 
clubs' speech will undoubtedly argue that the regulation exists to further 
the schools' mission of value inculcation. As a result, under a 
mission-based test, the constitutional issue hinges upon the degree to 
which courts are willing to place the school's own conception of its 
mission under scrutiny. 
Should courts take schools at their word? This question requires a 
case-by-case inquiry, dependent upon (I) the extent to which the school 
has delineated the specific information or values that it wants to com-
municate, and (2) the degree to which the school's actions create the 
objective impression that the transmission of values or information is 
163. 721 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Colo. 1989). 
164. Id. at 1194. 
165. It is worth noting that several states have responded to issues related to queer youth in more 
positive ways. Some have adopted statutes that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in their 
schools. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 89 (West 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.12 
(West 1996); 22 PA. CODE§ 5.4 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 16, § 565 as defined in VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit 16, § ll(a)(26) (West 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 118.13 (West 1996). Passage of this legislation 
has ushered in a new era of queer activism with high school students playing an active role in 
lobbying legislators. See Sara Rimer, Gay Rights Law for Schools Advances in Massachusetts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993, at A 18. A recent Seventh Circuit case, Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th 
Cir. 1996), demonstrates how much is potentially at stake for school districts that fail to adopt 
inclusive policies. Jamie Nabozny's classmates subjected him to repeated anti-gay harassment See 
id. at451. When the school district took no remedial action, Nabozny filed a lawsuit See id. at 451-
52. After the appellate court held that Nabozny had a cognizable claim, the school district settled out 
of court for $900,000. See $900,000 Won By Gay Man in Abuse Case, N.Y. TtMEs, Nov. 21, 1996, at 
811. 
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the purpose of the activity. Consider the free speech rights of a student 
in math class. The existence of a geometry textbook and a state-
authorized class curriculum suggests that the school is communicating 
specific knowledge about geometry. Furthermore, schools allocate the 
bulk of classroom instructional time to the transmission and discussion 
of this fixed body of information. As a result, a regulation on student 
speech in math class should receive minimal judicial scrutiny unless that 
regulation extends beyond what is needed to allow the school to trans-
mit the information. 
With student clubs, the scenario is very different. As self-governing 
units, the clubs are only rarely designed as vehicles for schools to con-
vey specific information or values. Furthermore, the existence of mul-
tiple clubs that range across a wide spectrum of interests and ideological 
perspectives indicates that the inculcation of specific values is not the 
objective furthered by student club activities. As a result, courts should 
consider student clubs as part of the school's mission to encourage ex-
ploration of independent interests and identities and hold regulations on 
most student groups, including queer student groups, unconstitutional 
because the regulations do not advance the mission. 
C. Queer Student Clubs Under Hazelwood 
Even if one accepts Haze/wood's premise that schools have one 
uniform mission, queer student organizations are no more threatening 
to that uniform mission of value inculcation than any other student 
group. The presence of a queer student group does not imply that the 
school "approves" of a particular sexual orientation as part of its desired 
value system any more than it adopts or endorses the ideological agenda 
of the Young Republicans. 166 Courts should not grant constitutional 
camouflage for schools to create empty distinctions between queer stu-
dent groups and other clubs whose purpose is to provide students with a 
sense of racial, gender, or ethnic identity. Like the Latino Students 
Union or the Irish Heritage Club, queer student groups provide their 
members with a sense of history and cultural identity, along with an at-
mosphere of support in an often hostile high school environment. 
Furthermore, when one considers the cumulative effects of club 
bans, it is difficult to understand how the regulation of queer clubs serves 
the "legitimate pedagogical objective" of value inculcation. Rather than 
sending a message condemning the discussion of human sexuality, state 
166. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 ("[A]n open forum in a public university does not confer any 
imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices .... [S]uch a policy 'would no more 
commit the University ... to religious goals' than it is 'now committed to the goals of the Students for 
a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance,' or any other group eligible to use its facilities." 
(quoting Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d I310, 1317 (1980))). 
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statutes like the one passed in Utah impair the educational, psychologi-
cal, and social development of queer teens. While bans at the elemen-
tary and junior high school level may be age appropriate, there is every 
indication that high school students can and do ponder questions related 
to human sexuality on a deeply personal level.167 A majority of gays and 
lesbians report experiencing same-sex attraction and arousal before the 
age of sixteen. 168 
The school's pedagogical imperatives become more dubious when 
one considers the vulnerable nature of the population in question. 169 Gay 
and lesbian youth are significantly more likely to attempt suicide than 
their straight counterparts.170 The failure of educational institutions to 
provide a supportive environment is among the factors that place queer 
youth at such tremendous social risk. 171 
D. High School Hate Groups 
One potential by-product of a mission-based test is the extension 
of First Amendment protections to a hypothetical Nazi student group 
or the non-hypothetical Students Against Faggots Everywhere. If part 
of the mission of public schools is to foster a student's independent 
consciousness, why should that mission not extend to a student who 
wishes to explore his identity as a Klan member or a homophobe? 
Indeed, at least one federal district court has already adopted this 
position in a high school context. In Pyle v. South Hadley School 
Committee, 172 two sons of a constitutional law professor challenged their 
high school's dress code provisions, which banned clothing that (1) con-
tained lewd or vulgar comments, (2) harassed or demeaned others based 
upon their sex, color, sexual orientation, or membership in other pro-
tected groups, or (3) advertised alcoholic beverages, tobacco, or drugs. 173 
167. See generally AARON FRICKE, REFLECTIONS OF A ROCK LOBSTER: A STORY ABOUT 
GROWING UP GAY (1981). 
168. See Dennis A. Anderson, Lesbian and Gay Adolescents: Social and Developmental 
Considerations, in THE GAY TEEN: EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE AND THEORY FOR LESBIAN, GAY AND 
BISEXUAL ADOLESCENTS, supra note 3, at 17-18. 
169. See Amy Lovell, "Other Students Always Used to Say, 'Look at the Dykes"': Protecting 
Students from Peer Sexual Orientation Harassment, 86 CALIF. L REV. 617, 623-28 (1998). 
170. See Blumenfeld, supra note 3, at 217 ("The earlier a young person is aware of same-sex 
attractions, the greater the problems they face and the more likely they are to develop suicidal 
feelings and behaviors."); Paul Gibson, Gay Male and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in U.S. DEP'T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON YOUTH SUICIDE 
3-110 (Marcia R. Feinleib ed., 1989) (stating that lesbian and gay youth are two to three times more 
likely to attempt suicide and that those suicides may constitute 30 percent of all completed youth 
suicides). But see Lovell, supra note 169, at 626 n. 48 (giving overview of critiques of Gibson's 
methodology). 
171. See Gibson, supra note 170, at3-128. 
172. 861 F. Supp. 157 (D. Mass. 1994). 
173. See id. at 163. 
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Over the course of a year, the brothers arrived at school dressed in a 
number of different T-shirts, bearing legends ranging from "Coed Naked 
Band; Do it to the Rhythm," and a depiction of two male soldiers kiss-
ing along with the inscription "Read My Lips," to a homemade "Coed 
Naked Censorship-They do it in South Hadley'' T-shirt.174 
The Pyle court upheld the school's "vulgar and lewd" provision un-
der Fraser but declared the "harassment" provision unconstitutional as 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.175 While the T-shirt of the two 
men kissing might be permissible (if not found to be vulgar or lewd), 
"[a] T-shirt carrying a depiction objecting to homosexuality, on the 
other hand, would be flatly forbidden by the code."176 
An in-depth discussion of the constitutionality of hate speech pro-
visions, as well as the applicability of RA. V. v. City of St. Pau/1 11 to 
public schools, is beyond the scope of this Comment. I would suggest, 
however, that under a mission-based test, schools could potentially 
regulate these groups within constitutional boundaries because their 
presence detracts from the school's mission to promote the independ-
ent exploration of interests and identities. High school hate groups, un-
like queer student groups, exist almost solely to prevent others from 
engaging in self-expression. If the purpose behind allowing student 
groups is to assist students in defining their interests or identities, the 
First Amendment should protect this interest. Because the existence of 
hate groups aetively prevents schools from advancing this mission, 
regulation of hate groups is needed to enable the school to further or-
ganizational objectives. 
In making this argument, I distinguish the mission advanced by stu-
dent clubs from the mission Professor Robert Post refers to as 
"democratic education"178 or "critical education."179 "Democratic educa-
tion" sees the "purpose of public education to be the creation of 
autonomous citizens, capable of fully participating in the rough and 
tumble world of public discourse"; 180 "critieal education" prioritizes edu-
cation's role in the discovery of truth, which requires an unfettered ex-
change of ideas.181 Both of these notions envision the educational 
mission in terms of its benefit to the larger society, whether as a train-
ing ground for the political process or as part of a larger seareh for 
174. See id at 161-63. 
175. See id at 170-73. 
176. Id. at 172. 
177. 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (declaring city hate speech ordinance unconstitutional as impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination). 
178. Post, Racist Speech, supra note 19, at 321. 
179. Id. at322. 
180. Id at 321. 
181. See id at 322. 
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truth. As a result, Professor Post argues that constitutional protection 
extends to hate speech, since the speech acts to further the institutional 
mission. 182 
By viewing the value of self-realization exclusively as a means to 
achieve larger goals, however, Professor Post's classifications ignore 
the value of self-realization as an end in itself. By relying upon rhetoric 
of fear and intimidation, hate speech directly inhibits the search for 
self-truth. If, as I briefly argued earlier, 183 the process of self-realization 
has an inherent value, and if hate speech inhibits that process, then 
some regulation of hate speech is appropriate to protect First 
Amendment values of self-realization in an educational context. 
The argument to deprive student hate groups of First Amendment 
protection has a number of obvious and potentially fatal problems. If 
the basis for distinguishing the self-expression of gay students from the 
expression of Nazi students is that the latter's rhetoric is designed to 
quash the self-expression of others, could a fundamentalist Christian 
student organization not offer the same critique of a gay/straight alli-
ance? In response, one could attempt to distinguish between speech and 
action, protecting the speech rights of hate groups only up until the 
point that it results in disruptive actions targeted at other students. Al-
ternatively, one could condition constitutional protection based upon 
the group's own conception of its objectives, creating a distinction be-
tween a hypothetical Straight Alliance and Students Against Faggots 
Everywhere based upon the degree to which their stated mission chal-
lenges the self-expression of others. If, however, a basic distinction be-
tween hate groups and queer student clubs is untenable, Tinker's 
"material or substantial disruption" test should provide an adequate 
safeguard to ensure that hate group activity does not significantly in-
trude on the rights of other students.184 
CONCLUSION 
As gay and lesbian youth become more vocal and visible through-
out American society, both inside and outside our schools, high school 
administrators and school district officials will be faced not only with 
new challenges, but with an opportunity to address the overwhelming 
needs of a long silent and underserved segment of the school popula-
tion. High schools, like other institutions, must reckon with the in-
creased recognition of sexual diversity within modem life. 
182. See id. at 322-24. 
183. See supra text accompanying note 159. 
184. See Phillips v. Anderson County Sch. Dist Five, 987 F. Supp. 488 (D.S.C. 1997) (applying 
Tinker test to find that school did not violate student's First Amendment rights by requiring student to 
refrain from wearing a jacket made to look like a Confederate flag). 
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Apart from policy concerns, queer student organizations will pres-
ent courts with the opportunity to reevaluate their approach to First 
Amendment doctrine, in terms of school speech, the forum-based ap-
proach, and questions of sponsorship. Adoption of a mission-based con-
tinuum model would not only address the underlying doctrinal concerns 
and provide a more solid foundation for categorical First Amendment 
analysis, but would more accurately reflect the complex organizational 
structure and pedagogical objectives of the American high school. 
